In recent years, a conversation has erupted over how prepared the United States is to counter foreign electoral interference. The discussion has largely focused on how the government might deter foreign election manipulation, and whether the nation’s values—including the freedoms of speech and expression and the integrity of electoral processes—are being threatened by any such efforts.
While the United States has a long history of intervening in foreign elections, these interventions have typically been geared toward trading gains or strengthening diplomatic and trade relations. This approach is often contrasted with the rhetoric of the Trump administration, which accuses Russia of intervening to promote its candidate and sow partisan division in America.
When evaluating the threat of foreign election interference, three considerations should be taken into account. First, the concept of election interference should be defined broadly. It includes activities that undermine confidence in democracy as a system of governance, or the legitimacy of an election, by raising doubts about the credibility of the process, driving polarization, or inducing fear and distrust.
The definition should also encompass cyber threats that exploit electoral technology, trolls or bots, misinformation campaigns, and hacking attacks against election authorities, including websites of EMBs, voter registration agencies, and polling locations. Finally, it should address any attempts to undermine electoral integrity through misleading claims, violence, or intimidation of voters and voting administrators.
Finally, the dialogue around the threat of foreign interference should address the unspoken assumption that the only relevant voices in an American election are those of domestic Americans. If a foreign government or citizen thinks a given candidate is the best or worst choice for their country, why should American citizens be denied access to that information when formulating how they vote?